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Abstract
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed sixty years ago as a defensive alliance, in response to the threat the Soviet Union and, eventually, the Warsaw Pact in general posed to Western Europe. Today, neither of those entities exists, yet NATO stands supreme as the institution most able to guarantee the security of its members, and the stability of the greater Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. With looming demographic challenges in Europe and a resurgent Russia asserting itself once more, many European nations are seeking NATO membership as a means of enhancing their security. For the United States (US), these developments present two primary policy options: disengage from the alliance and allow European institutions to cope with European issues; or maintain active US involvement and enlarge the alliance.
In exploring these policy options, the following areas were examined: the major multinational European organizations (NATO, EU, OSCE) and how the Balkan Wars of the 1990s defined their contemporary roles; the demographic changes projected in Europe through 2050 and their potential destabilizing effects; and the nationalist policies of Vladimir Putin and the resurgence of an aggressive Russia. Tying these areas together with the history of NATO, its philosophical core, and the stabilizing effect it provides (to both members and those seeking membership), an argument is presented that ultimately advocates enlarging the NATO alliance.
vi

INTRODUCTION
The year 2008 yielded a number of significant events that directly affected the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Of these events, the most dramatic was the Caucasus The two investigative thoughts above, regarding NATO's relevance and any future expansion of the treaty area, are inextricably linked. "The essential purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members in Europe and North America in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." 2 Now in its sixtieth year of successfully meeting that purpose, NATO's relevance as an institution is continually reaffirmed by the desire of non-member states to accede to the Alliance. If it is to remain relevant (in its quest to promote a peaceful Europe), NATO must continue to expand the umbrella of protection/security it provides to those countries that seek membership and can meet membership requirements.
Although the 'variable geometry' between those states that are members of the EU and not of NATO (or vice versa, see Table 1 ) continues to be reduced through the process of 'dual enlargement,' 3 the disparate role and influence of the US in those two organizations -external 1 AU/ACSC/THOMPSON/AY09 ambassadorial representation versus (preeminent and currently globally hegemonic) founding nation -cannot be minimized. Considering the grand strategic policy concerns of the US, with an accompanying altruistic concern for regional stability, it is the thesis of this monograph that NATO expansion should continue throughout Eastern Europe, as those countries are of strategic importance to the Alliance. Although the EU is seeking to create a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within its (still not ratified) constitution, there is currently no other international organization that has the capability, or legitimacy, of NATO (and none that gives the US as large a voice) that could supplant it in maintaining the security of current or near/mid term future treaty members throughout the greater Euro-Atlantic arena.
GETTING TO NOW
To lay a foundation for the policy options available, a review of relevant background information is required. The NATO alliance, as an entity, is presented with a focus on its ultimate purpose and the underlying philosophy that makes it much more than a traditional military alliance. A look at the transformation of Europe and the ongoing evolution of the EU/OSCE, with respect to NATO, continues the discussion, including consideration of the projected demographics/economics of Europe circa 2050). The resurgence of an aggressive Russia (Vladimir Putin's nationalistic rhetoric and energy policies anchor this area), and its relationship with NATO, closes the background portion of this paper. While the NATO information is presented as foundational, both the European and Russian areas are viewed more from the prism of the threats they may pose to the future. Both of the latter topic areas harbor the potential, left unchecked, to destabilize the European continent in a manner detrimental to the interests of both the US and our NATO/European allies. Their examination clarifies the continued strategic importance of NATO and yields the two primary options facing the US (with regard to NATO) today: allow NATO to diminish; or expand the Alliance.
NATO's Genesis
In the years immediately following World War II, Western Europe faced domination by the growing Soviet empire. While less than one million American and British troops remained on continental Europe in mid-1946, the Soviets had over four million men in the field and had kept their armament industries running at war-time levels. 4 One year later, the war-ravaged economies sovereignty, but the very ideals upon which Western society was rebuilt following World War II.
Members were not required to march lockstep regarding national policies, but having signed the Treaty, were expected to keep faith with its tenets, which would keep them entrenched in the "family of democracies" aligned against communism. 14 That other states may share those ideas and wish to contribute to, and benefit from, the alliance was recognized in Article 10 of the Thus, in its founding document, the seeds for NATO enlargement (which has brought the organization to its current complement of 28 nations) were sown. Although the very language used in Article 10 has led to controversy (e.g. what is a "European State?"; How is the "North Atlantic area" defined?), NATO enlargement was foreseen, expected and planned for from the outset. However, even Article 10 listed the requirement that a State be able to "further the principles of this Treaty" before the need for such a State to "contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." This emphasis further defined NATO as a philosophical alliance of nations with common security concerns, vice being solely a military alliance whose members happened to share a common philosophy. Undoubtedly a subtle distinction, the fact that "the West" faced an overwhelming military power in 1949 (and that NATO was poised against that power for over forty years) has served to cloud the philosophical side of NATO from most casual observers.
"Europe" and its Organizations
Similar to NATO, the European identity has a degree of nuance that eludes clarity at first glance. While the EU increasingly represents a united political and security view (in addition to its steadily maturing economic functions), it "does not yet include all European democracies, and different views of Europe's future among its members suggest that it will be years, if not decades, before the European Union equals 'Europe' in all its aspects." 16 In 1975 the then CSCE, which unlike the EU, includes Europe's North American allies (Canada and the US) as well as Russia, "was explicitly constituted to meet challenges of conflict prevention and crisis management and resolution" (emphasis added); 17 this implicitly placed the burdens of military action (should prevention fail and crises prove unmanageable by political means alone) beyond its purview. Though the EU and the OSCE have challenged NATO's supremacy (in its role as the guarantor of European security) at times, they have thus far been found wanting. Indeed in their current incarnations, they operate best when serving functions complementary to NATO's purpose (but beyond its mandate).
The current functions/roles of the EU, OSCE, and NATO itself were born out of the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. "When NATO engaged the Serbian airforce [sic] in 1993 it was the first shot in anger which the alliance had ever fired." 18 This engagement, however, was undertaken only after the EU and the CSCE had proven impotent in their attempts to stop the violence. As the Cold War dramatically culminated in the early 1990s, the Yugoslav crisis was seen as a chance for the European Community (EC -the EU was formed from the EC following implementation of 1991's Maastricht Treaty in 1993) 19 to "hone its 'common foreign and security policy', and act independently of the Atlantic alliance through European institutions to solve a regional conflict." 20 This effort failed.
The European Union
In 1991 the French and German governments sought to create, within the EC construct, a common ESDP based on the forces of the Western European Union (WEU). 21 With the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, this vision was put to the test. At the request of the French and British (who sought a "European response" to the crisis), the US did not conduct any diplomatic initiatives on its own. 22 Without belaboring the history, the EC negotiated a ceasefire to the hostilities, set up a monitoring mission, and asked the WEU to serve as its military enforcement arm. This initiative was unsuccessful because the WEU (paralyzed by internal disagreements)
failed to act and with no military power in place to enforce the ceasefire, the ceasefire was "meaningless in the eyes of the belligerents." 23 The 26 Ultimately, due to its lack of military capability and political strength, the EU's final role in the Balkans was limited to the realm of economic reconstruction. 27 The lessons of this experience would not be lost on Europeans when the ESDP was revisited later that decade.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The OSCE's (see Table 2 for current members) current raison d'être was, more so than even the EU's, shaped by the Yugoslav wars. Initially established in 1975 to "promote peaceful relations among states 'from the Atlantic to the Urals'," 28 it survived a Russian attempt to use it to co-opt NATO in the 1990s (the initial idea behind the Soviets' 1970s CSCE participation) and emerged instead as the premier European organization regarding human rights concerns.
In the early 1990s the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE OSCE's pre-1995 nomenclature), like all other multinational organizations centered on European affairs, sought to identify its purpose as the Soviet era ended. With an independent Russia (seeking to become a good global citizen) on the horizon, the Paris Charter was adopted by the CSCE in 1990. This defined "democracy, the rule of law, human rights, minority rights, political pluralism and respect for the environment [as the]…norms around which a CSCE 'security community' would be" built. 29 That the CSCE was the only organization (of itself, the EU, and NATO) in which Russia enjoyed an equal status (with the other "great powers" in the EuroAtlantic area) led Moscow to promote the CSCE as the dominant body for European political activities. In a dramatic display of realpolitik, however, the Russians (as the dominant voice speaking for the "still surviving" Soviet Union at the time), undermined that goal themselves. Having survived this Russian overreach, the OSCE's role in Europe was (re)defined by the 1995 Dayton Accords (temporarily ending the Balkan conflicts). In the agreement, the OSCE was charged with "supervising the 1996 Bosnian elections, monitoring human rights activity, and promoting arms control." 34 Building on that foundation, as the 1990s came to a close the OSCE became Europe's organization of choice for championing human rights, monitoring elections, mediating disputes and promoting democracy while "NATO provided the military backing required to give such efforts a chance to succeed." 35 Thus, just as the Balkan crisis solidified the economic role of the EU, the OSCE was ensconced in the role of "social services" coordinator for Europe. While many organizations in Europe had their identities redefined at the end of the twentieth century, Europe itself began a transformation as the twenty-first century dawned.
The Dichotomy of Demography
While the future remains unknowable, the countries of Europe are projected to undergo a demographical shift over the next forty years that poses a strategic concern for NATO. While the US population is expected to grow and experience only a slight median age increase (35.5 to 36 .2) 36 between now and 2050, the European NATO allies (and "Europe" as a whole) represent the inverse, a shrinking population with a median age increasing from 37.7 to 47. 37 Of the eighteen countries currently experiencing population decline worldwide, seventeen of them are in Europe (See Table 3 ) -with eight more European countries expected to begin contracting by 2019. 38 It has been suggested that this dichotomy will result in the US maintaining a vibrant workforce (and proportional share of world GDP), while Europe will (collectively) diminish in terms of both its population and its economic position on the world stage. and 78 percent of citizens in Spain, Germany, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands were either "somewhat" or "very concerned" about Islamic extremism. 41 With an aging/shrinking population (and an expanding immigrant cohort) Europe finds itself at a crossroads. As "Europe" attempts to identify itself via the EU construct, "most European NATO members are increasingly focusing on internal security, not defense, as a predominant concern." 42 If Europe was indeed "whole, free, and at peace" (a common literary refrain used to describe the greater mission of NATO) with no potential external threats, this would not be of grave concern. That this is not the case is only highlighted by (what may be the "last gasp" of) a resurgent Russia.
The Russian Federation
In the mid-to late 1990s an economically crippled Russia, appearing as a pale shadow of its former superpower self, seemed poised for rapprochement with the West. Today, this proud, resource-rich and nuclear-armed nation has seemingly reverted once more into an authoritarian state that is seeking to reclaim the glory days of its former empire.
The breakup of the Soviet Union (and subsequent collapse of the Russian economy) has proven to have been an opportunity squandered. While the George H. W. Bush administration failed to "provide swift economic help to the democratic government of the newly independent Russia in 1992," 43 it was outdone by the Clinton administration's policy of dictating reforms to Russia (that proved to be quite painful for that nation as a whole)in return for economic aid. 44 While this arrangement lasted as long as "cooperation with the West seemed a necessary avenue" 45 for progress in Russia, a rise in global oil prices and the ascendance of a new president soon served as the prelude to a dramatic revival of Russian nationalism.
As the 1990s came to an end, "a little-known Russian official…published an article in a local magazine. Russia, he demanded, should 'regain its former power' by using its 'natural resources potential.'" 46 The author making this demand was a former KGB officer named Vladimir Putin. Though the extent of his nationalistic bent was not readily apparent when he was programs and (in an effort to tie the masses even closer to him) began increasing nationalistic rhetoric at home while demanding to be dealt with as a "major power" abroad. 48 Thus "the first building block in Putin's national concept [was] Soviet nostalgia…to harness this pride to the current Russian state." 49 Unfortunately, a return to Soviet tactics was the second.
From his xenophobic portrayal of Russians who court western favor as "jackals" 50 round of NATO enlargement to proceed). 56 However in 1999, with the Balkan conflict reigniting in Kosovo, the relationship soured once more. NATO's "New Strategic Concept," released that year, contained a clause enabling non-Article 5 crisis response operations in non-member countries and was viewed by Russia as "part of a US strategy to establish global hegemony" that would upset the balance of power in Europe. 57 When NATO subsequently began conducting combat operations against Serbia in support of Kosovo, Russia claimed that it was an illegal action that co-opted the rightful role of the UN and was particularly upset that NATO had not utilized the PJC to conduct extensive consultations regarding the issue. 58 In addition to its operating "out of area" for the first time, Against this backdrop, Russia (much like the rest of Europe) 63 is projected to undertake a dramatic demographic transformation over the next forty years, with the population shrinking so rapidly it has been described as having "no historical precedent in the absence of pandemic." 64 According to forecasters, even with immigration Russia can expect to lose nearly one-third of its population, declining from 145.5 million to 104.3 million people (of which Muslims, both native and immigrant, will approach the majority) by 2050. 65 The effects of this demographic shift and the global economic downturn that began in late 2008 cannot be completely foreseen, but only add to the concerns about the potential Russia has for destabilizing the European continent.
What long-term impact Putin's (and his protégé, Dmitry Medvedev's) policies may have on NATO remains debatable. However, in deference to the strategic concerns (on the part of NATO member states and Europe as a whole) that accompany these policies, they demand the Alliance's consideration. That Russia chose to unleash its armed forces on Georgia (a comparatively "tiny" neighboring state), during a time when NATO and "the West" were focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, may well speak to the current limited capabilities of Russian military power. However, with the EU dependent upon Russia for 44% of its natural gas (78% of which passes through Ukraine) and 18% of its oil, 66 energy resources have become a weapon as well, and Russia has shown no compunction in wielding it as such.
WHAT FUTURE FOR NATO? US POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Considering the factors discussed to this point, a policy dilemma for the US (as it regards NATO) has emerged. With a graying/diversifying Europe and a world transformation that is seeing Europe diminish from its colonial/20th century importance, an argument could be made that the transatlantic relationship requires a reevaluation. Given the European states' continuing quest to identify "Europe" via the EU, the US could disengage from NATO and allow it to slowly diminish, letting Europe contend with its own issues via the EU or OSCE. Alternatively, America could seek to enlarge NATO and keep the alliance strong, serving as a stabilizing security umbrella in the midst of a changing world order and a (temporarily?) resurgent Russia.
Disengage from the Alliance…at the US' own Peril
The primary advantage of the first course of action is that it would disentangle the US European affairs would be limited to its ambassadorial relationship to the EU, and to the OSCE (where it would have a co-equal voice with Russia, which has used its voice to obstruct initiatives in the past). From a self-interest point of view, neither option serves US policy well.
Additionally it must be remembered that NATO, far from being just a military alliance, represents the ideas that form the core of the Western "Family of Democracies." An America that turned its back on NATO could be seen as an America that abdicated its leadership (of the global movement advocating democratic governments and market economies) 70 78 History bears witness to that being a poor option.
Enlargement cannot, however, happen so fast that it allows nations that are not ready (politically, economically, as well as militarily) to enter NATO just for the sake of expansion itself. For if a nation has not met the entry criteria prior to acceding, the Alliance would lose much of the leverage it had over that country to induce reform 79 (again making the case for further, but conditional, enlargement of NATO). Having strict accession criteria ensures that new members will be contributors to, and not merely consumers of, the security NATO provides.
Closing Thoughts
Despite the advocacy inherent in the discussion above, NATO enlargement cannot continue indefinitely. With seas to the North, West, and South, Turkey already in NATO, and the Caucasus region generally viewed as the southeastern flank of Europe, one can identify the logical borders of an enlarged NATO. However, NATO's area of stability (if not guaranteed security) can be expanded further via the PfP (see Table 4 ). The PfP's primary purpose "is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries." 80 As such, while not enlarging NATO, the "far-reaching political commitments" 81 PfP member-states must agree to ultimately extend NATO's sphere of influence/stability. The coordination and confidence the PfP (and other NATO "dialogues") 82 provide thus serve to expand NATO's philosophy, while retaining a Euro-Atlantic core. NATO enlargement itself, however, must not be reckless. While enlarging, the Alliance must consider Russian concerns to ensure that additional chaos is not created in the name of added security. With President Medvedev stating that Russia "has regions where it has its privileged interests," 83 NATO cannot appear to be proceeding in an offensive manner (a difficult proposition given that Russian leaders view NATO expansion as a realpolitik containment strategy meant to limit Russia's power and influence). 84 But neither can it, in retaining the 1990s mantra of giving Russia a "voice and not a vote" 85 at the NATO table, disregard the self-determination of any nation that wishes to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty (and meets accession criteria). With a world economic crisis emptying its treasury and looming demographic issues, 86 Russia may soon face a choice between allying itself with China, the Gulf
States, or the West to enhance and further its own security interests. NATO remains open to a future where Russia itself accedes, 87 and a stable Euro-Atlantic area would aid that choice.
In the final analysis, and given the extant/emerging global (e.g. non-Eurocentric) challenges to American interests, the idea that "the future of American foreign and defense policy would certainly be multilateral, but…not principally be transatlantic" 88 appears to be a valid prognostication. As the US looks ahead, however, it would do well to recall Samuel Huntington's warning that "the futures of both peace and Civilization depend upon understanding and cooperation among the political, spiritual, and intellectual leaders of the world's major civilizations. In the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately." 89 While the primary interests on both sides of the Atlantic will undoubtedly continue to evolve over time, a strong NATO, with its successful history of emerging from crises with its bedrock principles intact, 90 represents the most viable and logical place for the US and its European allies to "hang together" and promote their mutual interests.
In 1959, as he attended his final ministerial conference, the first Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Ismay, categorically stated that "the North Atlantic Alliance is the best, if not the only, hope of peace… [and] above everything else, we must be united. And then all will be well." 91 While one could argue that the qualifier "in the Euro-Atlantic area" must be added as we look to the future, this statement (while perhaps more idealistic in philosophy than it was in 1959) is nevertheless a contemporary clarion call to keep NATO strong. To accomplish this, future historians must record the final complement of NATO countries as a number somewhat larger than its current twenty-eight. Then, with a Europe "whole, free, and at peace" and a stable
Euro-Atlantic area, all may truly be well. 
